October 01, 2020 PDF
Western Price-Gouging in China
One of the major trends affecting society during the 1970’s and 1980’s was the reversal of position of (largest) manufacturers, (middle-sized) wholesalers and (smallest) retailers. Market power and influence corresponded with size. The manufacturer of a product appointed a few wholesalers to handle its lines, and obedience to price and marketing practice was obtained by the knowledge that lucrative contracts could be terminated, in which case a corporate life could be measurably shortened. This was even more true in the relationship with retailers, who often had marketing and promotion practices dictated to them, as well as firm pricing policies which could not be ignored. Those relationships may not have been the best for all concerned, but the markets were stable, distribution was efficient, and behavior was mostly responsible even if not always totally ethical. But with some retailers becoming extremely large, the balance of power shifted 180 degrees to the point where today some retail groups have almost absolute control of markets.
20世纪70年代和80年代影响社会的主要趋势之一是（最大的）制造商、（中型的）批发商和（最小的）零售商的地位发生了逆转。市场力量和影响力与规模相对应。一种产品的制造商指定了几个批发商来处理其生产线，并且由于知道利润丰厚的合同可能会终止，企业的寿命可能会大大缩短，因此遵守价格和营销惯例。在与零售商的关系中更是如此，零售商往往有自己的营销和促销实践，以及不容忽视的坚定定价政策。这些关系可能对所有相关方来说都不是最好的，但市场稳定，分销高效，行为主要是负责任的，即使并不总是完全合乎道德。但随着一些零售商变得极其庞大，权力平衡发生了180度的转变，以至于今天一些零售集团几乎完全控制了市场。
Price-gouging and price-fixing are a standard feature of Western capitalism, with virtually all foreign companies participating in these practices. Most governments focus their attention on price-fixing conspiracies because some laws exist to prevent the practice. Price-gouging by individual firms often escapes the regulatory net, although this should not be the case because the principle of using market position to overcharge is essentially the same. In one recent case in China, six LCD manufacturers, Samsung and LG from South Korea and four firms from Taiwan, were levied fines and other costs of nearly 800 million RMB for having engaged in a massive conspiracy to set prices at an extremely high level. The evidence was that these firms held a total of 56 meetings in South Korea to reach agreement on LCD pricing, adding huge costs to Chinese manufacturers of computers, mobile phones and similar devices since the LCD panels alone account for about 80% of the total cost. In addition to the heavy fines, these firms were required to refund nearly 200 million RMB to their customers. These same firms were also investigated and heavily fined by US and European authorities for the same violations. The fine in the US was $1.2 billion, nearly $900 million in Europe, and another $200 million in South Korea.
哄抬价格和操纵价格是西方资本主义的标准特征，几乎所有外国公司都参与了这些行为。大多数政府将注意力集中在操纵价格的阴谋上，因为有些法律是为了防止这种做法。个别公司的哄抬价格行为往往逃脱了监管网，尽管情况不应该如此，因为利用市场地位滥收费用的原则基本上是相同的。在中国最近发生的一起案件中，六家液晶显示器制造商，韩国的三星和LG，以及台湾的四家公司，因参与了一场将价格定在极高水平的大规模阴谋而被处以近8亿元人民币的罚款和其他费用。有证据表明，这些公司在韩国总共举行了56次会议，就LCD定价达成一致，这给中国的电脑、手机和类似设备制造商增加了巨大的成本，因为仅LCD面板就占总成本的80%左右。除了巨额罚款外，这些公司还被要求向客户退还近2亿元人民币。这些公司也因同样的违规行为被美国和欧洲当局调查并处以巨额罚款。美国的罚款为12亿美元，欧洲为近9亿美元，韩国为2亿美元。
International luxury brands have long set much higher prices for their products in China than in many other countries. In fact, luxury goods in China are not only priced high, but rarely or never discounted, these practices being so consistent and widespread, they are almost certainly the result of the same kind of collusion that was proven in the auto and baby milk markets. By contrast, it is common to see discounted luxury goods in Europe where major luxury brands such as LV and Gucci often offer discounts of 30% to 50% on many items during holidays and festivals. Executives of these foreign brands are always quick to blame the price differences on China’s luxury goods taxes, but these are not large compared to the huge price differences, and many of these goods are actually produced in China so import taxes are not a factor in any case. Chinese luxury goods prices that are often two and three times those in North America or Europe, derive almost entirely from a marketing strategy that assumes Chinese are infatuated with foreign goods and have more money than experience. Neither of those assumptions is true any longer, as evidenced by the dramatic plunges in the sales of these goods in China. Once the Chinese discovered the vast price differential, they either abandoned the purchases or did their buying in Europe. This part of the honeymoon is over.
长期以来，国际奢侈品牌在中国为其产品设定的价格远高于许多其他国家。事实上，中国的奢侈品不仅价格高昂，而且很少或从未打折，这些做法如此一致和普遍，几乎可以肯定，它们是汽车和婴儿奶市场上证明的那种勾结的结果。相比之下，在欧洲，折扣奢侈品很常见，LV和Gucci等主要奢侈品牌在节日期间经常为许多商品提供30%至50%的折扣。这些外国品牌的高管总是很快将价格差异归咎于中国的奢侈品税，但与巨大的价格差异相比，这些差异并不大，而且这些商品中的许多实际上是在中国生产的，因此进口税无论如何都不是一个因素。中国的奢侈品价格通常是北美或欧洲的两到三倍，这几乎完全源于一种营销策略，即认为中国人迷恋外国商品，金钱多于经验。这两种假设都不再成立，这些商品在中国的销售额急剧下降就是明证。一旦中国人发现巨大的价格差异，他们要么放弃购买，要么在欧洲购买。蜜月的这一部分结束了。
Here is a live example: At an Italian men’s clothing shop, Ermenegildo Zegna, in the Jing’An District of Shanghai, was a suit priced at 30,000 RMB, about $6,000 at the time. It was a reasonably nice men’s wool suit, more or less well-tailored but nothing special, and in North America or Italy it would have carried a price of perhaps $1,000 or $1,200, certainly no more. Here are the economics of that suit: for 6,000 RMB I can buy a return plane ticket to Italy, for another 6,000 I can stay there for a week’s holiday, and for another 6,000 I could buy that same suit. And return to Shanghai with nearly half of that 30,000 RMB still in my pocket. And that is why the sales of so-called luxury goods in China are failing.
这是一个活生生的例子：在上海静安区的一家意大利男装店，Ermenegildo Zegna有一套价格为30000元人民币的西装，当时约为6000美元。这是一套相当不错的男式羊毛套装，或多或少剪裁得体，但没有什么特别之处，在北美或意大利，它的价格可能会达到1000或1200美元，当然不会再高了。这套衣服的经济性如下：花6000元人民币我可以买一张去意大利的回程机票，再花6000元我可以在那里呆一周假期，再花六千元我可以买同样的衣服。然后带着那3万元人民币的近一半回到上海。这就是所谓奢侈品在中国销售失败的原因。
US-based Levi Strauss, the makers of Levi’s brand blue jeans, are one of the worst firms in China in terms of pricing practices. A pair of ordinary Levi’s blue jeans that sell in the US, Canada and Europe for about $40, are priced at 800 or 900 RMB in China, about four times as much, yet these products are made in China and should cost less. Even worse, I have heard persistent rumors that items passing the firm’s quality control tests are reserved for sale in the West while those failing are reserved for sale in China. The basic foreign clothing brands like Levi’s, Puma, Nike, Adidas, Gucci, are all far more expensive than in the West, even though these items are almost all manufactured in China and should cost less.
总部位于美国的李维斯蓝色牛仔裤制造商是中国定价最差的公司之一。一条在美国、加拿大和欧洲售价约40美元的普通李维斯蓝色牛仔裤，在中国的售价为800或900元人民币，大约是其价格的四倍，但这些产品是中国制造的，价格应该更低。更糟糕的是，我一直听说有传言称，通过公司质量控制测试的产品将保留在西方销售，而未通过测试的产品则保留在中国销售。李维斯（Levi’s）、彪马（Puma）、耐克（Nike）、阿迪达斯（Adidas）、古驰（Gucci）等基本的外国服装品牌都比西方昂贵得多，尽管这些产品几乎都是在中国制造的，价格应该更低。
Wines are worse than clothing. A $200 wine costs $1,000 in China. A bottle of champagne that costs $80 or $100 in the US or Europe, is 2,800 RMB in Shanghai, almost five times the price. The five so-called ‘first-growth’ French wines from Bordeaux that cost $200 everywhere else, are $2,000 in China. A second problem is that of the European wines imported into China, and certainly the French wines, almost all are from the bottom 20% or so in terms of quality, most from vineyards that even experienced wine drinkers have never heard of. Importers of European wines are not bringing the best into China, but the worst, most of which are not worth drinking but nevertheless carry prices of much finer wines. California wines are worse. Aside from the clear fact that European wines, especially those from France, are superior to anything produced in the US, the California wines brought into China are cheapest and lowest-quality but carrying prices five or more times their value. Almost all are overpriced rubbish. As I discuss elsewhere with olives and pistachios, California has a climate where many plants will grow, but few grow well enough to be marketable, meaning that perhaps the majority of California products are substandard, being grown far outside their natural habitat.
酒比衣服还差。一瓶200美元的葡萄酒在中国售价1000美元。一瓶香槟在美国或欧洲售价80美元或100美元，在上海售价2800元，几乎是价格的五倍。来自波尔多的五款所谓的“第一增长”法国葡萄酒在其他地方售价200美元，在中国售价2000美元。第二个问题是，在进口到中国的欧洲葡萄酒中，当然还有法国葡萄酒，几乎所有葡萄酒的质量都在20%左右，大多数来自即使是经验丰富的葡萄酒饮用者也从未听说过的葡萄园。欧洲葡萄酒的进口商并没有把最好的葡萄酒带到中国，而是把最差的葡萄酒带进中国，其中大多数葡萄酒不值得喝，但价格要高得多。加州的葡萄酒更差。除了欧洲葡萄酒，尤其是法国葡萄酒，比美国生产的任何葡萄酒都要好这一明显事实之外，带入中国的加州葡萄酒价格最便宜，质量最低，但价格是其价值的五倍或五倍以上。几乎所有这些都是价格过高的垃圾。正如我在其他地方与橄榄和开心果讨论的那样，加利福尼亚州的气候条件下，许多植物都会生长，但很少有植物生长得足够好，可以销售，这意味着加州的大多数产品可能都不合格，生长在远离自然栖息地的地方。
Foods are not better in any respect. In 2011, Yum! Brands had 19,000 KFC and other outlets in the US and only 3,700 in China, yet the company derived about 60% of its revenue and more than 50% of its profits from China, compared to 32% from the US. From these numbers, it is patently obvious that Yum! products are grossly overpriced in China, so it’s hardly a surprise sales are finally dropping. Häagen-Dazs, owned by Nestle, is a particular irritation, being so stupidly priced I cannot understand anyone buying that product, the company not only charging Chinese consumers three times the Western price but being repeatedly accused of short-weighting the packages. Nestle’s Nescafe isn’t much better. Similarly, nobody in the West would pay $5 or $6 for a coffee, $8 for a pound of butter or $15 for a pound of bacon. The same is true for all American and many foreign food products, the excessive prices unrelated to either importing costs or duties, many products costing seven or eight times the price in their home country. “Western” style restaurants like Hooters, Element Fresh, Wagas, Malones, and so many others, are similar, with prices far higher than would be charged in the West. Papa John’s must have set some kind of record for pricing pizza in Shanghai at about three times what it might charge in the West. In 2013, China issued fines of nearly 700 million yuan to six baby formula companies for conspiring to set minimum resale prices for distributors and punished distributors who sold their products at lower prices by suspending supplies or ending contracts. Their practices caused milk powder prices in China to rise to as much as three times the foreign prices, restricted competition in the market and illegally sucked billions of dollars from Chinese consumers.
食物在任何方面都不好。2011年，百胜！肯德基和其他品牌在美国有19000家分店，在中国只有3700家，但该公司约60%的收入和50%以上的利润来自中国，而美国的这一比例为32%。从这些数字可以明显看出，百胜！产品在中国定价过高，所以销量最终下降也就不足为奇了。雀巢（Nestle）旗下的哈根达斯（Häagen Dazs）尤其令人恼火，因为它的定价如此愚蠢，我无法理解任何人购买该产品，该公司不仅向中国消费者收取了西方价格的三倍的费用，而且还多次被指控包装重量过轻。雀巢的雀巢也好不到哪里去。同样，在西方，没有人会花5美元或6美元买一杯咖啡，8美元买一磅黄油，15美元买一英镑培根。所有美国和许多外国食品也是如此，过高的价格与进口成本或关税无关，许多产品的价格是本国价格的七到八倍。Hooters、Element Fresh、Wagas、Malones等许多“西方”风格的餐厅也很相似，价格远高于西方。Papa John’s在上海的披萨定价一定创下了某种纪录，大约是西方的三倍。2013年，中国对六家婴儿配方奶粉公司处以近7亿元的罚款，原因是它们合谋为经销商设定最低转售价格，并对以较低价格销售产品的经销商处以暂停供应或终止合同的处罚。他们的做法导致中国奶粉价格上涨至国外价格的三倍之多，限制了市场竞争，并非法从中国消费者那里吸走了数十亿美元。
Foreign automobiles are the same. In 2013 the WSJ published an article titled “Luxury-Goods Firms’ Little China Secret”, which began with the statement “The dirty little secret among luxury-goods companies is that they have been persistently overcharging their best customers in China.” The article discussed auto prices, which I deal with below, but noting that many luxury car models are 50% to 75% higher in China than in the US or Europe, even when those same autos are manufactured in China. The automakers attempt to defuse the issue by claiming Chinese cars have more features, but those additional accessories are a minor or trivial cost and account for little of the difference. The excessive cost in China is simple price-gouging and price-fixing, evidenced by the criminal investigations and huge fines levied against many of the foreign automakers.
外国汽车也是如此。2013年，《华尔街日报》发表了一篇题为《奢侈品公司的小中国秘密》的文章，文章开头写道：“奢侈品公司的肮脏小秘密是，他们一直在向中国最好的客户收取过高的费用。”，但要注意的是，许多豪华车型在中国的售价比美国或欧洲高出50%至75%，即使这些车型是在中国制造的。汽车制造商试图通过声称中国汽车有更多的功能来解决这个问题，但这些额外的配件只是一个很小或微不足道的成本，几乎没有什么区别。在中国，过高的成本只是简单的价格欺诈和价格操纵，许多外国汽车制造商的刑事调查和巨额罚款就是明证。
It seems everybody wants to get into the act of heavily overcharging consumers in China, and usually for substandard products. Samsonite, which to many people is basic McLuggage, have high hopes for China, having reclassified their ordinary low-cost products as luxury goods at three or four times the price. Like Starbucks, Nescafe, KFC and Pizza Hut, Samsonite are trying to rebrand themselves as a luxury-goods company to Chinese who are unfamiliar with their products. But the only real difference between Samsonite and McDonalds is the spelling of the name. The Thermos brand of vacuum bottles is the same; a very low-cost basic product in the US but ten times the price in China.
在中国，似乎每个人都想对消费者过度收费，而且通常是对不合格的产品。Samsonite，对许多人来说是基本的McLuggage，对中国寄予厚望，将他们的普通低价产品重新归类为价格是其三四倍的奢侈品。与星巴克（Starbucks）、雀巢（Nescafe）、肯德基（KFC）和必胜客（Pizza Hut）一样，Samsonite正试图向不熟悉其产品的中国人重塑自己的奢侈品公司形象。但Samsonite和McDonalds之间唯一真正的区别是名字的拼写。保温瓶品牌的真空瓶是相同的；在美国是一种非常低成本的基本产品，但价格是中国的十倍。
Retail giants like Wal-Mart, and others like 7-11 who dominate a niche, have proven to be poor value to society and far more greedy than their predecessors. One manifestation of this lies in the slotting and stocking fees now universally charged by these huge retailers. In other words, if you want your products in my store, you will pay heavily for the privilege. The large retailers have considerable power, with these fees having become a major profit source to the extent that most of these retail firms now make more profit from these fees and commissions than from the actual merchandising of the products themselves. These fees are not small. One California nut producer complained of having to pay US$50,000 each month to keep his products on retail grocery shelves. These fees and charges began in the US, in the most fertile land for corporate greed and plundering, and with a supportive government loathe to interfere in the workings of a “free market”. From there, the practice spread worldwide to the detriment of consumers everywhere. These fees constitute a form of extortion and caused widespread public disputes in China after Wal-Mart and Carrefour levied increases that suppliers considered outrageous. It is by no means unusual to see even high-profile international brands suddenly disappear from the shelves in both Wal-Mart and Carrefour, from companies refusing to pay.
像沃尔玛这样的零售巨头，以及像7-11这样占据利基市场的其他巨头，已经被证明对社会价值很低，而且比他们的前任更贪婪。这一点的一个表现是，这些大型零售商现在普遍收取进场费和进货费。换言之，如果你想让你的产品进入我的商店，你会为这一特权付出高昂的代价。大型零售商拥有相当大的权力，这些费用已成为主要的利润来源，以至于这些零售公司现在从这些费用和佣金中获得的利润比从产品本身的实际销售中获得的更多。这些费用不小。一位加州坚果生产商抱怨说，为了把他的产品放在零售杂货店的货架上，他每月必须支付5万美元。这些费用和收费始于美国，那里是企业贪婪和掠夺最肥沃的土地，支持政府的政府不愿干涉“自由市场”的运作。从那时起，这种做法在世界范围内蔓延，损害了各地消费者的利益。这些费用构成了一种勒索形式，并在沃尔玛和家乐福收取供应商认为离谱的涨价后，在中国引起了广泛的公众争议。即使是知名的国际品牌也会因为拒绝付款而突然从沃尔玛和家乐福的货架上消失，这绝非罕见。
A slotting fee is a one-time payment by a manufacturer or vendor to a retailer in order to obtain shelf space in the retailer’s store. In effect, the retailer is demanding a bribe from you, if you want him to carry your product. For a new product, the initial slotting fee might be 150,000 RMB ($25,000) per item, per store in a regional cluster of stores, but may be as high as 1.5 million RMB ($250,000) in high-demand markets like Shanghai. Slotting fees are bitterly hated by producers, and can be a major cost factor in the market introduction of any new product, since this “down payment” must be made before a product will appear on the store shelves. Stocking fees are monthly payments by a supplier to retailers to guarantee shelf space in the store. In effect, a supplier or manufacturer is paying a monthly rent to the retailer, at a fixed amount per square meter of shelf space. These fees are widespread in North America, in convenience stores like 7-11, grocery chains, retail chains like Wal-Mart, bookstores, pharmacies, and more. And with all the foreign firms here, they are certainly no stranger to China. If the US experience is any guide, firms in China are paying as much as 1 million RMB per year for each square meter of retail space, a huge cost that is passed on to the consumer. It’s extortion, but if you won’t pay, you will have no sales outlet. Suppliers must pay for every cm. of space, including aisles, shelf end caps, cooler footprints, everything. These fees are payable either in cash or in wholesale price discounts, or by surrendering dozens of cases of free products. This topic is politically very sensitive, and secret. According to one report, “When a US Senate Committee held a hearing on these fees, producers refused to testify unless they wore hoods and used a voice scrambler to conceal their identities, such was their fear of retaliation from retailers.”
进场费是制造商或供应商为获得零售商商店的货架空间而向零售商一次性支付的费用。实际上，如果你想让零售商携带你的产品，他就是在向你索取贿赂。对于一款新产品，在一个区域性的门店群中，每件商品的初始入场费可能为15万元人民币（2.5万美元），但在上海等高需求市场，入场费可能高达150万元人民币。插播费深受生产商的憎恨，并且可能是任何新产品在市场推出中的一个主要成本因素，因为在产品出现在商店货架上之前，必须支付这笔“首付款”。库存费是供应商每月向零售商支付的费用，以保证商店的货架空间。实际上，供应商或制造商每月向零售商支付租金，租金为每平方米货架空间的固定金额。这些费用在北美很普遍，包括7-11等便利店、杂货连锁店、沃尔玛等零售连锁店、书店、药店等。这里有很多外国公司，他们对中国当然并不陌生。如果以美国的经验为指导的话，中国的企业每年为每平方米的零售空间支付高达100万元的费用，这是一笔转嫁给消费者的巨大成本。这是敲诈勒索，但如果你不付钱，你就没有销售渠道。供应商必须为每厘米的空间付费，包括过道、货架端盖、冷却器占地面积等等。这些费用可以现金支付，也可以批发价折扣支付，或者交出几十箱免费产品。这个话题在政治上非常敏感和隐秘。根据一份报告，“当美国参议院委员会就这些费用举行听证会时，制片人拒绝作证，除非他们戴着兜帽并使用语音扰频器来掩盖自己的身份，这就是他们担心零售商报复的原因。”
In addition to slotting and stocking fees, powerful retailers like Wal-Mart or Carrefour will often charge promotional fees, entry fees, shared advertising fees, “sponsorship” fees, “anniversary celebration” fees, holiday celebration fees, and anything else they can imagine and get away with. Wal-Mart in 2010 had more than 20 categories of such fees, while Carrefour had 30. The greed became so great that at some of these firms individual store managers and buyers were levying their own ‘fees’ which oddly appeared on no invoices anywhere. It was so bad that one supplier in China had more than 30 million in sales to one of these foreign big-box firms, but less than 300,000 in profit because of all the fees charged. In the wide range of extortionate practices invented by large retailers to bleed their suppliers, a new scheme has recently appeared, that of demanding cash payments to be placed on, or to remain on, an approved list of suppliers. Large retailers have a thousand or more suppliers, so requesting what is euphemistically called an “investment payment” of even a few thousand dollars each, can easily produce an annual windfall of a hundred million dollars or more. The very large firms like Wal-Mart, Safeway or Carrefour can reap hundreds of millions each year since suppliers cannot often afford to sacrifice such a large customer.
除了入场费和备货费，像沃尔玛或家乐福这样强大的零售商还经常收取促销费、入场费、共享广告费、“赞助”费、“周年庆典”费、节日庆典费，以及他们能想象到的任何其他费用。2010年，沃尔玛有20多个此类费用类别，而家乐福有30个。贪婪变得如此之大，以至于在其中一些公司，个别商店经理和买家正在征收自己的“费用”，奇怪的是，这些费用在任何地方都没有发票。糟糕的是，中国的一家供应商向其中一家外国大型公司的销售额超过3000万，但由于收取了所有费用，利润不到30万。在大型零售商为榨干供应商而发明的一系列勒索行为中，最近出现了一种新的方案，即要求在批准的供应商名单上支付现金或继续支付现金。大型零售商有1000多家供应商，因此要求每个供应商支付数千美元的“投资款”，很容易每年产生1亿美元或更多的意外之财。像沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）、西夫韦（Safeway）或家乐福（Carrefour）这样的大公司每年可以收获数亿美元，因为供应商往往无法承担牺牲这么大客户的代价。
I have written of some of the practices of killing major domestic brands in a foreign market, but in a country like China there are still hundreds of thousands of smaller domestic brands which collectively still represent significant competition. These slotting and stocking fees are one tactic widely used by American firms to kill off these smaller brands. They are a competitive strategy to deliberately evict domestic brands from local retail distribution channels, a quite effective way to kill local brands and eliminate competition. The fact is that the large multinationals control the retail space and don’t want any competitors in it. There is so much money involved they will do whatever is necessary to maintain control of the space. Companies like Pepsi and P&G welcome, and would even overpay, high stocking fees to eliminate their less-well-financed domestic competition. In effect, they are paying retail outlets to drop domestic Chinese brands. If you want to kill all domestic products and force consumers to your foreign brands, these shelf “rentals” are less expensive than media advertising and far more effective, since this way you simply eliminate most other consumer choices. Since consumers cannot find local brands on the shelves, they are usually forced to purchase the foreign brands and, since the domestic brands have been forced out of the shelf space, they will slowly wither and die in the small towns. Consider the Bee & Flower brand, makers of one of the finest shampoos and hand soaps ever produced, superior in most respects to almost all of the so-called “premium” foreign brands. But the Brand’s shampoo normally sells for only 8-10 yuan while the bars of hand soap are priced at 3-4 yuan. If the stocking fees are raised too high, product retail prices might have to be increased by 50% to 100% to cover the increased fees, and such an increase would kill a brand by pushing it so far outside its normal price point. The alternative is to withdraw the brand from these retail outlets, which of course will also kill the brand since consumers can no longer find it.
我写过一些在外国市场上扼杀主要国产品牌的做法，但在中国这样的国家，仍有数十万个较小的国产品牌，它们共同代表着巨大的竞争。这些进场费和库存费是美国公司为消灭这些小品牌而广泛使用的一种策略。它们是一种故意将本土品牌逐出当地零售分销渠道的竞争策略，是扼杀本土品牌和消除竞争的一种非常有效的方式。事实是，大型跨国公司控制着零售领域，不希望有任何竞争对手。涉及的资金太多了，他们会采取一切必要措施来保持对零售领域的控制。百事可乐（Pepsi）和宝洁（P&G）等公司欢迎，甚至会多付高昂的库存费，以消除资金不足的国内竞争。实际上，他们正在付钱给零售店，让它们放弃中国本土品牌。如果你想杀死所有的国产产品，迫使消费者选择你的外国品牌，这些货架“租赁”比媒体广告便宜，而且更有效，因为这样你就可以消除大多数其他消费者的选择。由于消费者在货架上找不到本土品牌，他们通常被迫购买外国品牌，而由于国内品牌被迫离开货架，它们将在小镇上慢慢枯萎和消亡。以Bee&Flower品牌为例，该品牌生产有史以来最好的洗发水和洗手液之一，在大多数方面都优于几乎所有所谓的“优质”外国品牌。但该品牌的洗发水通常只卖8-10元，而香皂条的价格则在3-4元。如果库存费用提高得太高，产品零售价格可能不得不提高50%至100%来弥补增加的费用，而这样的上涨会使品牌远远超出正常价格点，从而扼杀品牌。另一种选择是从这些零售店撤出该品牌，这当然也会扼杀该品牌，因为消费者再也找不到它了。
Ten years ago in Shanghai I could find dozens of domestic brands of some kinds of snacks, like potato chips, but today in every supermarket large and small, it seems that 90% or more of the total shelf space is filled with the Lay’s brand (Pepsi). Similarly, I could once find dozens of brands of domestic Chinese chocolate bars but today it seems that 90% and even 100% of that shelf space contains only Snickers bars and Dove chocolates, both products of US-based Mars. The same process is occurring with tasteless and overpriced California pistachios and almonds, and during recent years all chewing gum everywhere appears to be the Wrigley’s brand – also owned by Mars. As another example, I would find dozens of Chinese brands of household cleaners, but today all those brands have disappeared to be replaced by inferior products from US-based S. C. Johnson at four times the price.
十年前，在上海，我可以找到几十个国产品牌的零食，比如薯片，但今天，在每一家大大小小的超市里，似乎90%或更多的货架空间都是莱的品牌（百事可乐）。同样，我曾经可以找到几十个品牌的中国国产巧克力棒，但今天看来，90%甚至100%的货架空间里只有士力架和德芙巧克力，这两种巧克力都是美国玛氏公司的产品。同样的过程也发生在无味且定价过高的加州开心果和杏仁上，近年来，各地的口香糖似乎都是瑞格利的品牌——也归玛氏所有。再举一个例子，我会发现几十个中国品牌的家用清洁剂，但今天所有这些品牌都消失了，取而代之的是美国S.C.Johnson的劣质产品，价格是其四倍。
Some of these stocking contracts are merely a rental payment for a stipulated amount of shelf space, and perhaps location. But many, perhaps more, contain an agreement to stock only a particular company’s products. One more way to ensure the disappearance of local brands. If you pay attention to the business news, you will sometimes read articles about a retailer reducing the number of available brands in many different product lines, often described as a “streamlining” effort or a move to “greater efficiency”. But most often, that’s not really what happened. Instead, some suppliers have formed a pact with the retailer to promote their products, often exclusively, having offered high enough payments to justify the retailer dumping the competing brands. Whenever you see what appears to be an excess of any one brand or any product in a shop, and an absence of others, you can suspect this is happening. Well-financed companies like Nestle, P&G, and Coca-Cola can afford to pay high fees to gain control of 80% of a retailer’s available space, with all other competitors sharing the little that remains. This practice exists in China on a far wider scale than realised, and certainly applies not only to food and beverage producers like Pepsi, Nestle and Danone, but to all foreign FMCG companies like P&G and Unilever. And on a retail basis, it certainly applies to foreign companies like Wal-Mart and Carrefour, 7-11, Family Mart and many more. And now that Wal-Mart has taken control of Yihaodian, we’ll watch to see how this plays out, and if brands begin to disappear. Certainly, Wal-Mart knows how to play this game better than most people. These exclusive contracts are also frequently the cause of sudden and large price increases. Often, an exclusive contract with (for example) Lay’s, could see all competing brands disappear, and Lay’s prices double.
其中一些库存合同只是规定数量的货架空间的租金，也许还有位置。但许多，也许更多，包含了一项只储存特定公司产品的协议。确保本土品牌消失的另一种方式。如果你关注商业新闻，你有时会读到关于零售商减少许多不同产品线中可用品牌数量的文章，通常被描述为“精简”努力或提高“效率”。但大多数情况下，事实并非如此。相反，一些供应商与零售商达成了一项协议，通常只推广他们的产品，并提供了足够高的付款，以证明零售商倾销竞争品牌的合理性。每当你看到商店里的任何一个品牌或任何产品出现过剩，而其他品牌或产品却没有，你就会怀疑这是在发生。雀巢（Nestle）、宝洁（P&G）和可口可乐（Coca-Cola）等资金雄厚的公司可以支付高昂的费用来控制零售商80%的可用空间，而所有其他竞争对手都只能分享剩下的一点点。这种做法在中国的规模远远超出了实际，不仅适用于百事可乐、雀巢和达能等食品和饮料生产商，也适用于宝洁和联合利华等所有外国快速消费品公司。在零售方面，它当然适用于沃尔玛和家乐福、7-11、全家超市等外国公司。现在沃尔玛已经控制了一号店，我们将拭目以待，看看它会如何发展，以及品牌是否开始消失。当然，沃尔玛比大多数人更清楚如何玩这个游戏。这些独家合同往往也是价格突然大幅上涨的原因。通常，与（例如）莱的独家合同可能会导致所有竞争品牌消失，莱的价格翻倍。
A series of disputes between suppliers and retailers attracted high-level attention in China in 2012, after Carrefour and Wal-Mart reportedly raised slotting allowances and other fees that outraged many product suppliers – certainly most domestic ones. China’s government is now deciding how best to regulate retail businesses and is drafting new rules to minimize disputes and complaints over these fees. But the practice is extortionate and a violation, and should be banned outright. This kind of US-brand predatory capitalism is damaging to everyone except the handful of beneficial stockholders of firms like Pepsi, P&G, J&J, Mars and Wal-Mart, and of course serves to increase the income disparity we all want to avoid. The process pushes all consumer prices increasingly higher, while forcing all low-cost, mostly domestic, products out of the retail market. Many economists have estimated that supermarket retail prices are at least 30% higher than would otherwise be the case without this predatory practice. If permitted to run free, it will destroy all competition, leaving consumers with only a few over-priced and low-quality choices of American products. These excessive payments not only increase consumer retail prices, but squeeze the profits of the suppliers since costs cannot be recovered through higher wholesale prices, and are driving many manufacturers out of the supermarkets and chain stores. We already see it in cities like Shanghai where, for personal care products, we have only the grossly-overpriced multiple brands of companies like P&G, Unilever and J&J, with most domestic brands no longer available.
2012年，家乐福（Carrefour）和沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）提高了入场费和其他费用，激怒了许多产品供应商——当然是大多数国内供应商——之后，供应商和零售商之间的一系列纠纷在中国引起了高层的关注。中国政府目前正在决定如何最好地监管零售企业，并正在起草新的规则，以尽量减少对这些费用的争议和投诉。但这种做法是敲诈和违法的，应该彻底禁止。这种美国品牌掠夺性资本主义对所有人都是有害的，除了百事可乐、宝洁、强生、玛氏和沃尔玛等公司的少数受益股东，当然还会增加我们都希望避免的收入差距。这一过程推高了所有消费者的价格，同时迫使所有低成本产品（主要是国内产品）退出零售市场。许多经济学家估计，超市零售价格至少比没有这种掠夺性做法的情况高出30%。如果允许免费运行，它将摧毁所有竞争，让消费者只能选择一些价格过高、质量低下的美国产品。这些过高的付款不仅提高了消费者的零售价格，而且挤压了供应商的利润，因为成本无法通过更高的批发价格收回，并将许多制造商赶出了超市和连锁店。我们已经在上海这样的城市看到了这种情况，在那里，对于个人护理产品，我们只有宝洁、联合利华和强生等公司的多个品牌定价过高，而大多数国产品牌已经不复存在。
Carrefour in particular are noted for their greed and lack of discretion in such matters, to say nothing of a lack of class. The firm exited the Korean market altogether after a huge criminal case where they were severely fined for their fee collections. In 2009 and 2010, the company also exited Russia, Japan and Portugal. In Belgium, Carrefour sold half their stores, closed the other half, and exited that country as well. And in 2010 China experienced a bit of an uproar in its retail markets precisely due to these fees, resulting in many domestic brands being forced to withdraw their products from Carrefour because of an increase in ‘commissions’ of up to 15%.
家乐福尤其以其贪婪和在此类问题上缺乏自由裁量权而闻名，更不用说缺乏阶级了。该公司在一起巨额刑事案件后完全退出了韩国市场，他们因收取费用而被处以巨额罚款。2009年和2010年，该公司还退出了俄罗斯、日本和葡萄牙。在比利时，家乐福卖掉了一半的门店，关闭了另一半，并退出了该国。2010年，正是由于这些费用，中国零售市场出现了一些骚动，导致许多国内品牌被迫从家乐福撤出产品，因为“佣金”增加了15%。
This retail model is a serious hindrance to creativity and innovation because it discourages businesses, especially small ones, from even attempting to create new products, since the up-front placement costs would simply be too high. And if a new product is created by a smaller or weaker competitor, the “expand and destroy” Managers at P&G, Pepsi or Mars, can use these stocking fees as a tool to prevent new competition from ever entering the market. The small company or the less-well-financed domestic company simply cannot afford to pay the millions or tens of millions of RMB that would be necessary to bump a P&G that is intent on defending its retail shelf space. Often, the only choice available to a small local competitor, almost regardless of the excellence of the new product, is to sell it to one of these predatory multinationals. The price won’t be high, but it’s all you get. During this brutal campaign, these same firms will cry increasingly louder for “a level playing field” and for even more access to China’s markets, all based on the jingoistic US corporate hypocrisy that “increased competition” is best for the market. But in fact the last thing any of these companies want is competition. Their entire souls are possessed with a determination to destroy that which they so fervently profess to venerate.
这种零售模式严重阻碍了创造力和创新，因为它阻碍了企业，尤其是小型企业，甚至不敢尝试创造新产品，因为前期安置成本太高了。如果一个新产品是由一个较小或较弱的竞争对手创造的，宝洁、百事可乐或玛氏的“扩张和毁灭”经理可以将这些库存费作为防止新竞争进入市场的工具。这家小公司或资金不太充足的国内公司根本无法支付数百万或数千万元人民币，这将是打击一家意图捍卫其零售货架空间的宝洁公司所必需的。通常，对于一个小型的本地竞争对手来说，无论新产品的卓越性如何，唯一的选择就是将其出售给这些掠夺性的跨国公司之一。价格不会很高，但这就是你所能得到的。在这场残酷的运动中，这些公司将越来越大声地呼吁“一个公平的竞争环境”，并要求更多地进入中国市场，所有这些都是基于美国企业的沙文主义虚伪，即“增加竞争”对市场最有利。但事实上，这些公司最不希望的就是竞争。他们的整个灵魂都下定决心要摧毁他们如此狂热地宣称崇敬的东西。
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Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 32 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chapt. 2 — Dealing with Demons).
罗曼诺夫的作品已被翻译成32种语言，他的文章发表在30多个国家的150多个外语新闻和政治网站以及100多个英语平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口公司。他曾是上海复旦大学的客座教授，为EMBA高级课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生住在上海，目前正在写一系列与中国和西方有关的十本书。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》的特约作者之一。（第二章——对付魔鬼）。
His full archive can be seen at
他的完整文章库可以在以下看到
https://www.moonofshanghai.com/ and https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/
He can be contacted at:
他的联系方式：
2186604556@qq.com
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本文件可能包含受版权保护的材料，其使用未经版权所有者的特别授权。这些内容是根据合理使用原则提供的，仅供教育和信息之用。此内容没有商业用途。
Copyright © Larry Romanoff, Moon of Shanghai, Blue Moon of Shanghai, 2022